In divided political environments legal and illegal opponents have divergent interests. As part of their role in relieving popular dissatisfaction, loyalists are allowed to challenge the regime. Thus, loyalists' mobilization costs are smaller than illegal opponents' costs. However, in return for this privilege loyalists agree to help maintain the system; thus, they pay a high price if they destabilize it. In contrast, illegal opponents can capitalize on increasing discontent to mobilize popular unrest. They face higher costs for mobilizing popular protest than their loyalist counterparts. However, unlike loyalists, they are not penalized more for destabilizing the system. Thus, they pay smaller mobilization costs if they join an ongoing conflict than if they mobilize independently.
Consequently, divided and undivided political environments create different protest dynamics. In divided environments loyalists who previously mobilized popular movements may become unwilling to challenge incumbents when crises continue, even if their demands have not been met. Because loyalists have organizational structures and lower costs of mobilizing an independent protest, they are often able to exploit the early stages of crises to demand reforms. However, as crises continue, radicals gain strength and become more likely to join in demonstrations, even if they are unwilling to mobilize independently. Thus, to avoid the possibility that radicals exploit unrest to demand radical reforms, moderates choose not to mobilize. The very same elites who previously exploited economic discontent to demand political change now remain silent, while radicals who might take to the streets if the moderates mobilized are unwilling to do so alone.11 Thus, in a divided environment moderates who previously challenged incumbent elites may choose not to continue to do so when radical groups join, even if incumbents have not accommodated their demands.
In an undivided political environment opponents remain willing to mobilize as crises continue. Loyalists do not fear the inclusion of radicals in their unrest. As the probability of successfully opposing the government increases, the expected utility of conflict increases. With only one opposition group, once the opposition is willing to mobilize, it remains willing as long as its probability of success increases and its demands have not been met. Even when important divisions exist between opposition groups, opponents willing to challenge the regime will continue to do so as economic crises continue. Knowing that another opposition group will challenge does not decrease the willingness of the first to challenge the regime. Thus, as the probability of success increases in an undivided political environment, a moderate group that has previously challenged the government will continue to do so, regardless of the radicals' strategy.
Economic Crises and Political Opposition
The different political environments of Jordan and Morocco explain the divergent dynamics of political unrest in the 1980s. This difference was not an inevitable out- Thus, the monarchs created different political environments. In Morocco political party elites were sharply divided from groups left out of the political system. The palace controlled the loyalist opposition's participation in the political arena and limited its demands. Loyalist opposition elites were required to accept the king's supremacy and support Morocco's bid for the Western Sahara. Within these constraints, however, they acted as the king's "spokesmen of demands," providing an important channel of communication between the masses and the palace and relieving popular frustrations.12 In return, they enjoyed government subsidies and privileged access to the palace. Illegal opposition, mainly religious-based societies, remained outside this system.13 Many questioned the legitimacy of the king and the political system, including the role of the included parties. Despite their potential for antiregime activity, however, King Hassan II allowed the growth of Islamic opposition in the early 1980s, attempting to counter his secular opponents. He thus fostered a divided political environment.
In contrast, King Husayn created an undivided political environment. He allowed the professional associations and the Muslim Brotherhood a limited political role and promoted divisions among opponents. Most notably, he promoted the Muslim Brotherhood to counter secular opponents and played upon divisions between Palestinian and Jordanian opposition elites to weaken the opposition. However, he did not separate opponents into loyalist and radical factions in the formal political system.
Challenge in the Divided Political Environment: Morocco
The divided political environment in Morocco helps to explain why loyalists became less willing to challenge King Hassan II as the crisis continued. The king created incentives for loyalists to refrain from promoting a conflict that excluded opponents could exploit. As radicals became stronger, loyalists became unwilling to mobilize protests to obtain political reforms.
Loyalists exploited the 1981 economic crisis to demand both economic and political changes. Although the government made economic concessions, it rejected political demands and refused to engage in dialogue with the opposition-led Conftdcration Democratique du Travail. Indeed, although it allowed the Union Maroc du Travail (UMT), Morocco's progovernment union, to call a general strike, it prohibited the CDT from also striking. It hoped to defuse popular hostility, while containing the CDT.
The opposition nevertheless called a general strike on June 20.14 The CDT saw the crisis as an opportunity to force the government to make concessions. 15 Held nationally on a Saturday, the strike challenged the regime's ability to maintain control. An energized, angry populace supported "their strike," and in Casablanca and Mohamedia unemployed youths rioted. The armed forces responded. By the end of June 22 there was a large number dead; thousands were arrested; and party newspapers were suspended.16 On June 23 the parliamentary opposition called for an inquiry into the government's response. 17 The palace responded with economic concessions but also increased security. The king denounced the CDT for instigating the riots and divided Casablanca into five administrative districts to strengthen local control.'8 As the 1983 elections approached, he also dangled the hope of future concessions if party leaders did not repeat the 1981 strikes.
Political contestation in the early 1980s remained primarily between the king and the parties. More radical opponents did not mobilize in concert with the strikes. Within a nonexplosive political environment, the opposition took advantage of the lower mobilization costs accompanying the economic crisis to demand reform, just as the conventional wisdom would predict.
However, as the crisis continued, more radical opponents gained popular support, while legal opponents appeared weak. Loyalists did not want to repeat their experience in the 1981 general strike. They also joined the government in preparation for new elections, with party leader 'Abd al-Rahim Bu'abid appointed minister of state.19 This appointment put them in a difficult position. They wanted to mobilize against price increases, but they were afraid to sacrifice the chance for gains in the upcoming elections. Thus, they spoke against economic adjustment but did not mobilize a general strike. 20 Nevertheless, in January 1984 demonstrations shook the country. In response to increased prices and rumors of impending tuition increases, students took to the streets.21 With nearly one-half of its strength located around Casablanca, where the Islamic Summit Conference was convened, the security forces responded slowly. Demonstrations spread to approximately fifty cities and included a wide range of social groups.22 It took nearly three weeks for security forces to restore order. Hassan II then appeared on television, promising not to raise prices on staple goods, something only weeks earlier he had argued was inevitable.23 By January 23 all was quiet. Approximately one hundred persons were killed, and USFP party members were prosecuted, but the party did not react.
The 1984 riots were far more significant than the 1981 strikes. The demonstrations began without negotiations between the unions and the government. Indeed, although the parties' statements had fueled frustration, the parties did not call a strike. The 1984 rioting lacked a clearly defined leadership in officially recognized channels. This lack was evident in the speech from the throne on July 7. The king, waving a picture of Khomeini and tracts from the illegal opposition group Ilal Amam, blamed Communists, Marxists, Leninists, and Islamists for the unrest. 24 With the costs of mobilization during the Islamic Conference low, social forces outside the official channels of power now challenged the government.
After 1984 both included opponents and the palace recognized that more radical, excluded groups could exploit public dissatisfaction to make demands that neither liked. Consequently, the king sought to strengthen the loyalists' political control. The loyalists, fearing both the high costs of repression and demands of the radicals, became less willing to challenge the palace.
Following the rioting, the king sought to strengthen his control. In a campaign to foster his religious legitimacy he appointed a new minister of Islamic affairs.25 In 1988 he also strengthened nonreligious associations in the larger cities to give individuals an alternative venue for political participation.26 Most important, the palace reinforced the role of the legal political parties. As Zartman noted:
After the 1981 and 1984 riots, the king required all candidates in the September 1984 elections to be members of a party. Henceforth, opposition was to be organized and organizations were to be responsible, thereby enlisting them in the government's job of control. With a common interest in avoiding anomie, government and unions bargain over demands in support of the polity. 27 Loyalists hoped the partnership would expand their power, but they were disappointed. During the 1984 elections the nationalist parties, including the Istiqlal party, lost parliamentary seats to the promonarchy Constitutional Union.28 The parties also suffered from internal weaknesses, in part due to internal debates over the extent to which they would benefit from cooperating with or challenging the king. By the late 1980s some party leaders argued that, unless they put pressure on the king, they would remain in an unacceptably stifling political situation. In 1989 the king asked the opposition parties to support postponement of the elections for two years to give time for the situation in the Western Sahara to improve. Although relations between the USFP and government were tense, the USFP eventually agreed.
However, when political and economic changes were not made by early 1990, CDT and USFP leaders began to rally for a general strike. By April 1990 the CDT called for a general strike, but other opposition parties refused to join.29 Consequently, the CDT postponed the strike. A stalemate lasted until December. Debates within the parties and discussions between the CDT and the UGTM led to a jointly sponsored strike on December 14, 1990. The government warned public ser- The opposition's demands were not met. In campaigning for the upcoming elections, the parties continued to demand political reforms.32 Furthermore, while direct elections were a success for the opposition parties, indirect elections were disappointing. After the USFP, OADP, PPS, and Istiqlal won one hundred of the 222 seats in the direct elections, the minister of interior allegedly stepped in to reverse this success. In the indirect elections the opposition parties and their associated unions won only twenty-two of 111 seats, leading them to call "foul." 33 Although the king offered the opposition a limited role in the government, he would not allow them to mobilize in the streets.34 In February 1994 the CDT called for a general strike, but the UGTM, the UMT, and the opposition parties were unwilling to agree. A UGTM leader explained: "we could smell trouble in the air." The prolonged economic crisis raised levels of frustration. Combined with Ramadan fasting, they feared a general strike would become uncontrollable.35 The king also announced that a general strike would be illegal.36 If the CDT persisted in mobilizing, the penalties would be high. Within twenty-four hours of the deadline, the CDT delayed the strike. Consequently, the king responded publicly and directly to the union's demands in his throne speech of March 3 and resumed social dialogue.37
By the mid 1990s opposition parties were unwilling to mobilize. In part, they were unwilling due to internal difficulties.38 More important, many feared the demands and inertia of dissatisfaction among the masses. This fear was evident during the railway strike of 1995. Shortly before Eid al-Idha, railway workers called a nationwide strike. Their dissatisfaction had been mounting, and at last the three major unions, the UMT, CDT, and UGTM, announced an indefinite strike. Union leaders expected the work stoppage to be relatively short, but their members were prepared for a much longer, harsher struggle. For nearly one month CDT leader Nubir Amaoui tried to call off the strike. He was concerned that a prolonged struggle would lead to violence and that it could possibly spread to and be exploited by other groups. Undoubtedly, it could result in repression of the union and the party. It could also exacerbate already high tensions in the party. Despite his concerns and his popularity as a union and party leader, the strike continued for twenty-eight days, to June 6, 1995.39 It won some concessions, but also demonstrated the extent to which the legal opposition feared an uncontrollable movement.40
The opposition ended the strikes despite unmet demands. Opposition parties had recently conducted difficult negotiations with the government. Hoping to entice the opposition parties to join the government, the king had offered them portfolios after the 1994 elections, but they refused, demanding the removal of the minister of the interior, Driss Basri.41 The king responded that removing the heavy-handed interior minister would "dangerously affect the good running of the sacred institutions," and negotiations broke down.42 After nearly one month, Prime Minister Filali formed a cabinet of traditional loyalists, and opposition demands remained unmet.43
The union also thwarted the strikes despite fewer government threats. In contrast to 1994, the palace took a less threatening tone. It argued that the strikes would hurt the economy, but it did not repress the opposition.44 It did not need to do so.
The opposition feared that the Islamist opposition would use disorder as a springboard. Islamists in Morocco remained fragmented but were getting stronger.45 Through the economic crisis they strengthened their ties with the people by providing social support services that the masses desperately needed. In contrast, the opposition parties seemed impotent and focused on political debates in which the majority of Moroccans had little interest. Islamist activity on the campuses and confrontations between Islamists and secularists became more common. Islamists rioted at the University of Fes in February 1994, leaving five seriously injured.46 In addition, Islamists had access to potentially dangerous resources, as the discovery of arms caches in and around Fes in the summer 1994 showed. Party leaders made some efforts to diffuse competition with the Islamists by drawing them into the party structure.47 However, the chasm between the two camps was wide. Many Islamists viewed the party system as conservative and ineffective and rallied for a more radical departure from the status quo. Similarly, most party elites considered the Islamists' agendas to be worse than the current system and worried about Islamists' increasing strength.48 Thus, they declined to promote popular unrest, which they feared Islamic elites would harness to demand radical change.
The parties also feared increased repression. Since 1990 the government granted some concessions. The revision of the constitution, public acknowledgment of the union's demands following the proposed general strike in 1994, the removal of Prime Minister Lamrani, a long-time opponent of the unions, and the resumption of social dialogue were all steps toward negotiation with the legal opposition. However, the palace also made it clear that opposition attempts to press demands through popular mobilization would not be tolerated. Party elites, who remembered the repression of the 1960s and the early 1970s under the current minister of interior, knew that, if they promoted unrest, they would pay a very high price.
The opposition parties were thus squeezed between explosion from the bottom and repression from the top, which narrowed their political space and made them less willing to mobilize for political concessions. Loyalists thus preferred to back down than to escalate conflicts with the palace.49 As one Moroccan intellectual put it in 1995, "we look at Iraq, Algeria and Iran and know that we are much better off."o50 In part, the rift between the Brotherhood and the palace was due to the king's foreign policies. His engagement with Arafat in the peace process raised considerable opposition, which he hoped to reduce by repressing the MB.59 Furthermore, as the economic situation worsened, he turned away from his alliance with Iraq and toward restoring relations with Syria.60 Distancing himself from the MB could help, since Syria claimed that Jordan had supported its MB opposition.
Opposition-Government Interactions in an Undivided
Nevertheless, the Islamists in the undivided political environment were not deterred from confronting the king. As the MB gained strength, it became less likely to compromise with the king. Islamists did not fear other groups' joining in the fray but rather used popular discontent to demand political reforms.
The first unrest occurred in 1986 at Yarmouk University. On May 11 students demonstrated for the revocation of increased fees, the Arabization of the university's curriculum, an end to rigid control over students' lives, student representation on university committees, and the release of detained colleagues. Authorities arrested demonstrators, but the protestors grew to nearly 1,500. Students demanded both economic and political reforms. Riot police stormed the campus. Three students were killed, many injured, and nearly 800 arrested. Husayn angrily blamed the Communist party and MB for the unrest, recognizing that the opposition spanned the ideological spectrum and might coalesce. In the undivided political environment such spiraling conflict between the king and the opposition is expected. As the economic situation deteriorates, the probability that the opposition can succeed in mobilizing unrest increases. Because no political opponents will be disadvantaged in an exploited conflict, they are willing to coalesce to press their demands. The king's only hope of controlling the situation is to coopt greater portions of the political field, while increasing the costs of mobilization through greater repression. Not surprisingly, by 1998 most activists and observers agreed that the system had returned nearly full circle to the dark year of 1988.94
Yet, while opposition groups feared the king's retribution, they did not fear each other. Indeed, repression only united them further. Political pluralism and a joint struggle to obtain it can benefit all. As MB leader Khalil al-Shubaki explained with regard to the Brotherhood's cooperation with leftist parties: "It is coordination over a common cause. It does not mean that we recognize the legitimacy of their thoughts. We believe in political pluralism as long as it is within the general Islamic framework. What we want for ourselves, we want it for others too."95
Conclusion
The dynamics of political unrest during periods of economic crisis should vary systematically, depending on political environment. In an undivided environment political demands increase as popular discontent increases. During prolonged economic crises political opponents become more likely to demand political change. Their coalitions also widen as the crises continue. In a divided environment loyalists become less likely to press for political change. During prolonged economic crises excluded political contenders expand their popular support. This opposition becomes increasingly threatening to both the government and the loyalist opposition, and it nearly paralyzes the latter. Loyalist elites, fearing that radical forces may exploit political instability to press their own demands, become unwilling to mobilize the masses against incumbents.
It is thus theoretically rewarding to extend the analysis of government-opposition relations to include the way incumbents structure relations between competing opposition groups. The influence of political environments is not limited to monarchies. For instance, in Egypt the divided environment under Mubarak has helped keep the loyalist opposition in check, particularly in the early to mid 1990s. Similarly, in Iran the shah's decision to eliminate competing opposition parties in the mid 1970s removed the last vestiges of legitimacy from the party system. In the resulting undivided system, a broad coalition of opposition forces united to overthrow the shah.
Despite the importance of political environments, many questions remain unanswered. The most difficult is why incumbents promote certain institutional arrangements. Why do they admit a wider or narrower portion of political constituencies to the formal system? It is much more difficult to explain why than to examine how these institutions affect political behavior. Second, how well do incumbents in these institutional arrangements withstand severe political challenges? When does a degree of political liberalization limit opponents' demands, and when does it provide fuel for greater mobilization? Preliminary research suggests that a weak security system, in which opposition groups can exploit some political unrest, may help reduce opposition in the divided but not in the undivided environment. To understand fully the prospects for political reform in authoritarian states, it is necessary to explain more fully how incumbents promote and preserve different relations among their political opponents. 49. Party members noted "now was not the time" to mobilize the masses, but students argued that the parties had become unwilling to challenge the palace. Interviews with observers, economics students, and party members, 1995.
